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Abstract
Background: The minimum wage creates both winners (through wage increases) and—potentially—losers
(through job losses). Research on the health effects of minimum wage policies has been sparse, particularly across
gender and among racial/ethnic minorities. We test the impact of minimum wage increases on health outcomes,
health behaviors and access to healthcare across gender and race/ethnicity.
Methods: Using 1993–2014 data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, variables for access to
healthcare (insurance coverage, missed care due to cost), health behavior (exercise, fruit, vegetable and alcohol
consumption) and health outcomes (self-reported fair/poor health, hypertension, poor physical health days, poor
mental health days, unhealthy days) were regressed on the product of the ratio of the 1-year lagged minimum
wage to the state median wage and the national median wage, using Linear Probability Models and Poisson
Regression Models for dichotomous and count outcomes, respectively. Regressions (total population, gender-
stratified, race/ethnicity stratified (white, black, Latino), gender/race/ethnicity stratified and total population with
interaction terms for race/ethnicity/gender) controlled for state-level ecologic variables, individual-level
demographics and fixed-effects (state and year). Results were adjusted for complex survey design and Bonferroni
corrections were applied to p-values such that the level of statistical significance for a given outcome category was
0.05 divided by the number of outcomes in that category.
Results: Minimum wage increases were positively associated with access to care among white men, black women
and Latino women but negatively associated with access to care among white women and black men. With
respect to dietary quality, minimum wage increases were associated with improvements, mixed results and
negative impacts among white, Latino and black men, respectively. With respect to health outcomes, minimum
wage increases were associated with positive, negative and mixed impacts among white women, white men and
Latino men, respectively.
Conclusions: While there is enthusiasm for minimum wage increases in the public health community, such
increases may have to be paired with deliberate strategies to protect workers that might be vulnerable to
economic dislocation. Such strategies may include more robust unemployment insurance or increased access to
job training for displaced workers.
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Background
Federal law establishes a minimum wage for most
types of workers throughout the country, and many
states set a higher minimum wage [1]. Studies suggest
that minimum wage impacts income in two different
ways: increasing wages for employed low-wage
workers and potentially reducing employment. How-
ever, it appears that the net effects are small [2–5].
Given the contribution of income to health, the ef-
fects of the minimum wage may well be important.
Income underlies three major determinants of health:
access to healthcare, environmental exposures and
health behavior [6].
The relationship between minimum wage and health
may be even more complex given that there may be
differential income effects depending on gender, race
and ethnicity. With respect to differential effects by
gender, women constitute a larger proportion than
men of workers either at or below minimum wage so
women, particularly white women, could benefit more
than men from minimum wage increases [7]. Racial
and ethnic minorities may experience disparate em-
ployment loss associated with minimum wage in-
creases as a consequence of workplace discrimination
in layoffs and due to lower levels of human capital in
the context of reduced employment demand [1, 8, 9].
Additionally there may be differential effects of the
minimum wage across race/ethnicity and gender due
to different patterns of distribution across job sectors
[8]. Differential labor-market outcomes may result in
differential health impacts across gender/racial/ethnic
groups that are masked when looking at average
effects.
The majority of studies of the health impacts of
minimum wage explore average effects for all low in-
come workers [10–12]. A few studies have explored
the interplay of minimum wage and gender for
health [10, 13, 14] and only two studies, to our
knowledge, have examined the implications of gen-
der, race/ethnicity and minimum wage for health
[13, 14]. Andreyeva et al. (2018) explores this re-
search question and does not find significant effects
of minimum wage increases on racial/ethnic minor-
ities (Latinos and Blacks); however, they do not dis-
aggregate their results by racial/ethnic group and
they do not explore if there are any interactions be-
tween race/ethnicity and gender [13]. Averett et al.
(2017) explores this question in a cohort of teen-
agers and finds that minimum wage increases are as-
sociated with worse self-reported health among
Latino men [14].
The objective of this study is to examine the ef-
fects of minimum wage on the access to care, health
behaviors and health outcomes for different racial/
ethnic/gender groups. This analysis provides empir-
ical evidence that helps build out the conceptual
framework for the effects of minimum wage laws on
health by considering the effects on subpopulations
in which this relationship has seldom been
examined.
Methods
Data sample
To examine associations between minimum-wage pol-
icies access to care, health behaviors and health out-
comes, among racial/ethnic minorities and across
genders, this study analyzes a data from the Behav-
ioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and
state-level data from other sources covering the 21-
year period from 1993 to 2014. The BRFSS is con-
ducted by state health departments, with technical
and methodological assistance provided by the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention. This study
sample includes individuals between the ages of 21
and 64. Consistent with the work of Horn et al.
(2017), individuals who were homemakers, retired,
self-employed, long-term unemployed, unable to work,
and students were excluded from the sample. To
focus on low-skill workers, the sample was limited to
those individuals who reported educational attainment
of high school (or General Educational Development
test) or lower. A dataset was constructed consisting
of pooled cross-sectional observations at the individ-
ual level, combined with state-level data on the pre-
vailing minimum wage rate and several other policy
and labor force characteristics that vary over time
and across states. These ecological data were collected
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Bureau of
Economic Analysis and the University of Kentucky
Center for Poverty Research [15–17]. This study was
deemed exempt by the University of California, Los
Angeles Institutional Review Board.
Measures
Between 1993 and 2014 there were 313 minimum-
wage changes (mostly increases) due to state and
some federal legislation [10]. The state-specific me-
dian wage data used to construct the primary pre-
dictor are from the United States BLS [15]. We used
the larger of the state or federal wage rate as the pre-
vailing minimum wage and dates for minimum wage
laws are based on the year of implementation.
The economic meaning of the minimum wage var-
ies with local labor market conditions. A recent ana-
lysis studied the effects on the labor market of an
increase in the federal minimum wage to $15/h, and
found wide variations across states [18]. Some of this
variation is due to differences in state minimum
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wages, but much is due to differences in state labor
market conditions. In some states, many low-skill
workers already earn very close to the proposed new
federal minimum wage, whereas in other states very
few do. For example, although the current state
minimum wage is very similar in Connecticut
($10.10/h) and Minnesota ($9.86/h), the market wage
for low-skill work is lower in Connecticut than in
Minnesota, so that an increase to $15/h in both
states would increase the wages of 26% of Connecti-
cut workers and only 15% of Minnesotan workers. In
Arkansas, where the state minimum wage is only
slightly lower, at $9.25/h, 39% of the workforce
would see an increase. Put differently, the state
minimum wage is more economically binding in Ar-
kansas than in Minnesota.
One way to capture these differences would be to
divide the minimum wage by the local cost of living.
But the cost of living, although correlated with aver-
age wages, is in fact not a factor in the low-skill
labor market [19]. Therefore, economists have used
a measure called the Kaitz index, which divides the
minimum wage by the local average wage in the sec-
tor(s) most likely to be affected by the minimum
wage [20, 21].
Our primary predictor is the Kaitz index with a
slight modification to enhance interpretability: we
multiply the ratio of the 1-year lagged minimum
wage to the low-skill average wage) by the average
national low-skill wage so that one unit can be gen-
erally understood as $1. The benchmark low-skill oc-
cupation is the state-specific median wage for first
line supervisors/manager of sales workers (before
1999) and retail sales workers (after 1999). These oc-
cupations are chosen because they are typical low-
skill positions that would be affected by the mini-
mum wage and they have the most consistent defini-
tions across time. In average-wage states, the
regression coefficients can be interpreted as the effect
of a $1 increase in the minimum wage. In high-wage
states, the regression coefficients can be interpreted as
the effect of an increase of more than $1, scaled to re-
flect the state’s higher-than-average wages. In low-
wage states, the regression coefficients can be inter-
preted as the effect of an increase of somewhat less
than $1. Additional file 1 reports these adjustment fac-
tors for all state-year combinations. Since most other
studies exploring the relationship between minimum
wage and health have used either the real or lagged
minimum wage as their primary predictor we provide
the results of models using the 1-year lagged minimum
wage as a predictor as well; however, we will only be
discussing the results derived from models including
our main predictor, the adjusted wage ratio.
The two access to care variables, uninsurance (lack
of health insurance) and missed care due to cost,
were treated as indicator variables that were coded
as “1” if the condition was present. Four health be-
havior outcomes were examined: 1 each pertaining
to exercise and alcohol consumption and 2 pertain-
ing to dietary intake (fruit and vegetables). An indi-
cator for “no exercise in the last 30 days” was coded
as “1” if the condition was present and the
remaining health behavior variables for alcohol, fruit
and vegetable consumption were count variables
based on consumption during the last 30 days. We
examine the amount of days alcohol was consumed
in the last month because there is evidence that
even moderate daily drinking may increase the risk
of developing liver disease [22]. The health outcomes
examined included 5 self-reported health outcomes:
fair or poor health; diagnosis of hypertension; poor
mental health days; poor physical health days; and
unhealthy days. Self-reported fair or poor health and
self-reported hypertension were indicator variables
coded as “1” if the condition was present [23]. Self-
reported poor mental health days and poor physical
health days were treated as count variables based on
the last 30 days. Following guidance from the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, self-re-
ported unhealthy days was a count variable
constructed by combining the number of poor men-
tal and physical health days [24, 25].
Included in the models are several time-varying,
state-level covariates to control for possible confound-
ing by local political environments. These variables
were potentially associated both with the states’ deci-
sions to modify a minimum-wage law and also with
the health outcomes of interest. A variable for a
state’s 1-year lagged Gross Domestic Product, using
data obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
reflects the economic environment [17]. Several vari-
ables characterize state-level welfare and assistance
policies to capture the degree of state-specific gener-
osity, including the percentage of the federal Earned
Income Tax Credit that the state offers as a supple-
ment, an indicator of whether this supplement is re-
fundable and an indicator reflecting comprehensive
Medicaid expansion to childless adults [26]. Two vari-
ables were included to capture state-level generosity
in poverty policies: (1) the maximum monthly Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefit
amount and (2) the maximum monthly food-stamp
benefit amount, both for a family of 3. As a further
control for possible confounding, the models also in-
cluded state and year-level fixed effects in the models.
The use of state-level fixed effects controls for any
time-invariant state differences in political culture or
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economic environment that is unmeasured but that
would otherwise confound the analysis. The inclusion
of year-level fixed effects controls for any time trends
that may be associated with changes to minimum
wage policy. Lastly, several individual-level variables
that may vary with time and have implications for
self-reported health outcomes are included (age, race/
ethnicity, gender, marital status, education and having
minor children).
Statistical analysis
We calculated the mean and standard error for our
main predictor, adjusted minimum wage ratio, for
each census region, over 5-year intervals and for the
entire sample. We also calculated proportions and
means for our dichotomous and count outcomes, re-
spectively. The unit of analysis was the person-year
for all analyses. Linear Regression Models and Poisson
Regression Models (PRM) were estimated for dichot-
omous and count outcomes, respectively. Linear re-
gression applied to dichotomous outcomes, also
known as a Linear Probability Model (LPM), can be
used when the sample size is large, since the distribu-
tion of the variables can be assumed to be normal
under these circumstances [27]. Use of the LPM also
allows direct interpretation of the coefficient of the
primary predictor. We use a PRM to model count
outcomes instead of an Ordinary Least Squared re-
gression model because the normality assumption
may not be applied to count data even in the context
of large sample sizes if the number of counts is small.
Additionally, use of the PRM will account for the
non-linearity of count data [28]. All models were
weighted to account for complex survey design and
non-response by using the sampling weights provided
by the BRFSS. Additionally, robust standard errors
clustered at the state level were used. We employed
these adjustments through the SVY command with
the linearized option in Stata version 13 (StataCorp
LP, College Station, TX). All monetary variables are
adjusted for inflation. We initially ran models for
each outcome inclusive of the entire sample and then
we ran models stratified by gender. Next we ran
models stratified by race/ethnicity (white, black and
Latino) and models stratified by both race/ethnicity
and gender. Lastly, we ran analyses for the total
population including interaction terms for race/ethni-
city/gender and the adjusted wage ratio. In addition
to these main analyses, we ran models stratified by
race/ethnicity/gender and high vs. low wage state and
analyses stratified race/ethnicity/gender and marital
status. The results of these analyses can be found in
appendices 3–6 and 7–10, respectively. In order to
adjust the level of statistical significance for multiple
comparisons, we apply the Bonferroni correction such
that the level of statistical significance for a given
outcome category is 0.05 divided by the number of
outcomes in that category (access to care (2): p-
value≤0.025, health behavior (4): p-value≤0.0125 and
health outcomes (5): p-value≤ .010) [29]. The results
of the LPMs and PRMs are presented as marginal ef-
fects and rate ratios, respectively.
Results
A table showing the adjusted wage ratio by time and
census region can be found in Appendix 2. The full-
sample mean of the adjusted wage ratio variable is 6.11
and the interquartile range is 3.18–9.37. The descriptive
statistics for the covariates and outcomes are found in
Table 1.
Results for all races (Total Population & across Gender)
The results capturing the impact of minimum wage
increases, on the access to care, health behaviors
and health outcomes for all races (total population
and stratified by gender) can be found in Table 2.
Among the total population, a $1 increase in the
minimum wage reduced the probability of reporting
no insurance and care cost by 2 (β = −.02; 95% CI = -
.03 to −.02), and 1 percentage points (β = −.01; 95%
CI = -.01 to −.00), respectively, in average wage
states, controlling for other factors. With respect to
health behaviors, a $1 increase in minimum wage in-
creased the expected number of times fruit was con-
sumed and servings of vegetables were consumed by
3% (β = 1.03; 95% CI =1.00 to 1.06), and 5% (β =
1.05; 95% CI =1.03 to 1.07), respectively, in average
wage states.
Among men, minimum wage increases were linked
with decreased reports of no health insurance (β = −.03;
95% CI = -.04 to −.02), and missed care due to cost (β =
−.01; 95% CI = −.02 to −.00) as well as increased vege-
table consumption (β = 1.05; 95% CI =1.02 to 1.08).
Among women, minimum wage increases were
associated with reduced reports of no insurance
(β = −.01; 95% CI = -.02 to −.01) and increased re-
ports of vegetable consumption (β = 1.05; 95% CI =1.02
to 1.08).
Results for whites (Total Population & across Gender)
The results of stratified models for whites are pre-
sented in Table 3 and the results of the models
using interaction terms are found in Table 4. In
stratified models, minimum wage increases were as-
sociated with reduced reporting of missed care due
to cost (β = −.01; 95% CI = -.01 to −.00) and in-
creased vegetable consumption (β = 1.03; 95% CI =
1.00 to 1.05), among the total white population.
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Among white men, there is a positive association be-
tween minimum wage increases and reporting no ex-
ercise (β = .01; 95% CI = .00 to .02), vegetable
consumption (β = 1.03; 95% CI =1.00 to 1.06) and
self-reported fair/poor health (β = .01; 95% CI = .00
to .02). In models with interaction terms, the im-
pacts of minimum wage increases are associated with
reduced reports of no insurance (β = −.02; 95% CI =
−.03 to −.02) and missed care due to cost, (β = −.01;
95% CI = -.02 to −.01) and positively associated with
vegetable consumption (β = 1.05; 95% CI =1.02 to
1.07) and poor mental health days (β = 1.04; 95% CI
=1.00 to 1.08). The minimum wage effects on no ex-
ercise and self-reported fair/poor health are no lon-
ger significant.
In stratified models including white women, mini-
mum wage increases are positively associated with
vegetable consumption (β = 1.03; 95% CI =1.00 to
1.05) and decreased reporting of fair/poor health
(β = −.01; 95% CI = -.01 to −.00). In the models with
interactions terms, minimum wage increases are
positively linked to missed care due to cost (β = .01;
95% CI = .01 to .01), but negatively linked with re-
ports of hypertension (β = −.01; 95% CI = -.01 to-
.00), poor mental health days (β = .98; 95% CI = .96
to .99), poor physical health days (β = .97; 95% CI =
.95 to .99) and unhealthy days (β = .98; 95% CI = .96
to .99). The relationships between minimum wage,
self-reported fair/poor health and vegetable con-
sumption are no longer significant.
Results for blacks (Total Population & across Gender)
The results of the stratified models, conducted in the
black population (total, men or women) (Table 5), did
not reveal any statistically significant relationship be-
tween minimum wage increases and any of the access
to care, health behavior or health outcomes; however,
in models using interaction terms (Table 4), minimum
wage increases were found to be positively associated
with reports of no health insurance (β = .02; 95% CI =
.02 to .03) and missed care due to cost (β = .01; 95%
CI = .00 to .02) but negatively associated with vege-
table (β = .92; 95% CI = .89 to .94) and alcohol con-
sumption (β = .96; 95% CI = .93 to .99) among black
men. Among black women, minimum wage increases
were found to be negatively associated with reports of
no health insurance (β = −.02; 95% CI = −.03 to −.01).
Results for Latinos (Total Population & across Gender)
In stratified models of the total Latino population
(Table 6), minimum wage increases were positively
associated with fruit intake (β = 1.10; 95% CI =1.01
to 1.21), poor physical health days (β = 1.15; 95% CI
=1.02 to 1.30) and unhealthy days (β = 1.14; 95% CI
=1.00 to 1.30). Among Latino men, minimum wage
increases were associated with reduced reports of no
health insurance (β = −.03; 95% CI = -.06 to −.00) as
well as increased fruit consumption (β = 1.10; 95% CI
=1.01 to 1.21) and reports of poor physical health
days (β = 1.19; 95% CI =1.00 to 1.41). In models
using interaction terms, minimum wage increases
were negatively associated with reports of no health
insurance (β = −.01; 95% CI = -.02 to −.00), no exer-
cise (β = −.03; 95% CI = −.04 to −.02), fruit consump-
tion (β = .96; 95% CI = .92 to .99) and self-reported
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Mean (SD) or %
Access to Care
Uninsurance 26.2
Missed care due to cost 20.2
Health Behaviors
No exercise in the last 30 days 32.9
1Days ETOH consumed in the last 30 days 5.2 (6.6)
Times fruit consumed in the last 30 days 23.1 (26.7)
Vegetable servings consumption in the
last 30 days
26.3 (23.0)
Health Outcomes
Self-reported hypertension 25.4
Self-reported fair or poor health 16.9
Poor mental health days in the
last 30 days
3.7 (6.9)
Poor physical health days in the
last 30 days
2.8 (6.0)
Unhealthy days in the last 30 days 5.9 (8.4)
State-level variables
State Earned Income Tax Rate .04 (.07)
2State EITC is Refundable 28.1
Maximum Temporary Needy Assistance
Benefit for 3
390 (140)
Maximum Food Stamp Benefit for 3 423 (31)
1-year lagged Gross Domestic Product % 4.1 (2.4)
Medicaid Expansion to Childless Adults 9.2
Individual-level variables
High School Diploma/GED 73.7
Age 40.5 (10.2)
Black 12.3
Latino 20.8
Female 42.5
Married 56.9
Minor Children 51.9
1. ETOH = Alcohol. 2. EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit. All estimates are
weighted to reflect sample design
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fair/poor health (β = −.01; 95% CI = -.02 to −.00) and
positively associated with vegetable consumption
(β = 1.05; 95% CI =1.01 to 1.08), missed care due to
cost, (β = .01; 95% CI = .02 to .00), poor physical
health days (β = 1.06; 95% CI =1.00 to 1.13) and un-
healthy days (β = 1.06; 95% CI =1.01 to 1.10). No
statistically significant relationship were observed for
any outcomes among Latino women in stratified
models; however, models using interaction terms
showed reduced reports of missed care due to cost
among Latino women associated with minimum
wage increases (β = −.03; 95% CI = -.04 to −.01) .
Discussion
This study examined the association between mini-
mum wage policies, access to care, health behaviors
and health outcomes, across race/ethnicity and gender
by analyzing 21 years of data (1993–1914) from the
BRFSS and other sources of state-level data. We
found that in the total population, minimum wage
Table 2 The Relationship of Minimum Wage, Access to Care, Health Behaviors and Health (All Races)
Outcome Total Men Women
Wage Ratio Minimum Wage Wage Ratio Minimum Wage Wage Ratio Minimum Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.02
(−.03,-.02)
N = 869,908
-.03
(−.04,-.02)
N = 869,908
-.03
(−.04,-.02)
N = 399,604
-.04
(−.05, −.03)
N = 399,604
−.01
(−.02,-.01)
N = 470,304
−.02
(−.03,−.01)
N = 470,304
Missed care due to cost1 −.01
(−.01,-.00)
N = 822,864
−.01
(−.02,-.01)
N = 822,864
-.01
(−.02, −.00)
N = 378,071
−.02
(−.03, −.01)
N = 378,071
−.01
(−.02,.00)
N = 444,793
−.01
(−.02, −.00)
N = 444,793
Health Behavior
No exercise1 −.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 781,929
.01
(−.00,.02)
N = 781,929
.00
(−.01, .01)
N = 358,495
.01
(−.01, .02)
N = 358,495
−.01
(−.02,.00)
N = 423,434
.00
(−.01,.02)
N = 423,434
Fruit Consumption2 1.03
(1.00,1.06)
N = 446,162
1.01
(.98,1.04)
N = 446,162
1.04
(.99,1.08)
N = 203,157
1.02
(.97,1.06)
N = 203,157
1.02
(.99,1.05)
N = 243,005
1.00
(.96,1.04)
N = 243,005
Vegetable Consumption2 1.05
(1.03,1.07)
N = 443,602
1.01
(.99,1.03)
N = 443,602
1.05
(1.02,1.08)
N = 201,663
1.01
(.97,1.04)
N = 201,663
1.05
(1.02,1.08)
N = 241,939
1.01
(.99,1.04)
N = 241,939
Alcohol Consumption2 1.01
(.98,1.03)
N = 554,781
1.00
(.96,1.03)
N = 554,781
1.01
(.97,1.04)
N = 273,817
.99
(.95–1.03)
N = 273,817
1.01
(.97,1.05)
N = 280,964
1.00
(.96,1.05)
N = 280,964
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 .00
(−.00,.01)
N = 869,457
−.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 869,457
.01
(−.00,.02)
N = 399,603
.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 399,603
−.00
(−.01,.00)
N = 469,854
−.01
(−.02,.00)
N = 469,854
Self-reported HTN1 .00
(−.00,.01)
N = 474,408
.00
(−.01,.02)
N = 474,408
.01
(−.01,.02)
N = 217,249
.01
(−.01,.02)
N = 217,249
.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 257,159
.00
(−.01,.02)
N = 257,159
Unhealthy Days2 1.02
(.99,1.05)
N = 858,345
1.00
(.97,1.04)
N = 858,345
1.03
(.99,1.07)
N = 394,779
1.01
(.96,1.07)
N = 394,779
1.01
(.98,1.04)
N = 463,566
.99
(.96,1.03)
N = 463,566
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.03
(.99,1.07)
N = 848,897
1.01
(.97,1.05)
N = 848,897
1.05
(.99,1.11)
N = 390,704
1.03
(.96,1.10)
N = 390,704
1.01
(.97,1.05)
N = 458,193
.99
(.94,1.04)
N = 458,193
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.02
(.98,1.06)
N = 849,354
1.00
(.96,1.05)
N = 849,354
1.02
(.96,1.09)
N = 391,031
1.01
(.94,1.09)
N = 391,031
1.01
(.97,1.06)
N = 458,323
.99
(.94,1.05)
N = 458,323
The data source is BRFSS (1993–2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count
outcomes, respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food
stamp allotment for a family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, race/
ethnicity, marital status, education and having minor children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design
and non-response. Total population models also control for gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and
PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-
adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care: p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health
outcomes: p-value .010) (Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence Intervals in parenthesis). Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio; Bold indicates
statistical significance
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increases were associated with improvements in ac-
cess to care and dietary quality. In analyses conducted
within race/ethnicity/gender subgroups we found that
minimum wage increases were associated with im-
proved access to care among white men, black
women and Latino women but were associated with
mixed impacts on the access to care of Latino men
and negative impacts on access to care among white
women and black men. With respect to dietary
quality, minimum wage increases were associated with
dietary improvements, mixed results and negative
impacts among white, Latino and black men, respect-
ively. Additionally, minimum wage increases were
negatively linked to reports of no exercise and alcohol
consumption among Latino and black men, res-
pectively. With respect to health outcomes, minimum
wage increases were negatively associated with reports
of hypertension, poor physical health days and poor
Table 3 The Relationship of Minimum Wage, Access to Care, Health Behaviors and Health (Whites)
Outcome Total Men Women
Wage Ratio Minimum Wage Wage Ratio Minimum Wage Wage Ratio Minimum Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 −.00
(−.01,.00)
N = 623,932
−.01
−.02,−.00)
N = 623,932
-.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 289,254
−.01
(−.02,.00)
N = 289,254
−.00
(−.01,.00)
N = 334,678
−.01
(−.02, .00)
N = 334,678
Missed care due to cost1 −.01
(−.01,-.00)
N = 589,983
−.01
(−.02,-.00)
N = 589,983
−.01
(−.01,.00)
N = 273,535
−.01
(−.02, −.00)
N = 273,535
−.01
(−.02, .00)
N = 316,448
−.01
(−.02,-.00)
N = 316,448
Health Behavior
No exercise1 .00
(−.00,.01)
N = 557,307
.01
(.00,.02)
N = 557,307
.01
(.00,.02)
N = 257,669
.02
(.00,.03)
N = 257,669
−.01
(−.02,.00)
N = 299,638
.00
(−.01,.02)
N = 299,638
Fruit Consumption2 1.02
(1.00,1.05)
N = 322,351
1.00
(.97,1.04)
N = 322,351
1.04
(.99,1.08)
N = 148,088
1.01
(.96,1.06)
N = 148,088
1.01
(.98,1.04)
N = 174,263
1.00
(.96,1.04)
N = 174,263
Vegetable Consumption2 1.03
(1.01,1.05)
N = 321,288
1.00
(.98,1.02)
N = 321,288
1.03
(1.00,1.06)
N = 147,452
.99
(.96,1.03)
N = 147,452
1.03
(1.00,1.05)
N = 173,836
1.00
(.98,1.03)
N = 173,836
Alcohol Consumption2 1.01
(.98,1.03)
N = 404,016
1.00
(.97,1.03)
N = 404,016
1.01
(.97, 1.04)
N = 199,207
1.00
(.95,1.04)
N = 199,207
1.01
(.97,1.05)
N = 204,809
1.01
(.96,1.06)
N = 204,809
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 .00
(−.00,.01)
N = 623,682
−.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 623,682
.01
(.00,.02)
N = 289,243
.01
(−.00,.02)
N = 289,243
−.01
(−.01,-.00)
N = 334,439
−.01
(−.02,−.00)
N = 334,439
Self-reported HTN1 .00
(−.01,.01)
N = 343,549
−.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 343,549
.00
(−.01,.02)
N = 158,946
−.00
(−.02,.01)
N = 158,946
−.00
(−.01,.01)
N = 184,603
−.00
(−.02,.01)
N = 184,603
Unhealthy Days2 1.01
(.98,1.03)
N = 616,008
.99
(.96,1.03)
N = 616,008
1.02
(.97,1.06)
N = 285,904
1.00
(.94,1.06)
N = 285,904
1.00
(.96,1.03)
N = 330,104
.98
(.94,1.02)
N = 330,104
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.00
(.96, 1.03)
N = 609,531
.97
(.93,1.02)
N = 609,531
1.00
(.94,1.06)
N = 283,124
.98
(.91,1.05)
N = 283,124
.99
(.95,1.03)
N = 326,407
.97
(.92,1.02)
N = 326,407
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.02
(.98,1.07)
N = 610,595
1.01
(.96,1.06)
N = 610,595
1.04
(.97,1.11)
N = 283,629
1.02
(.94,1.11)
N = 283,629
1.00
(.95,1.06)
N = 326,966
.99
(.93,1.06)
N = 326,966
The data source is BRFSS (1993–2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count outcomes,
respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp allotment for a
family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, marital status, education and having minor
children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also control for
gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of
an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care:
p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value−.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010) (Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals in parenthesis). Notes: 1.
Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio; Bold indicates statistical significance
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mental health days among white women but positively
associated with poor mental health days among white
men. Among Latino men, minimum wage increases
were negatively associated with self-reported fair or
poor health but positively associated with poor
physical health days. This is one of the few studies,
to our knowledge, to explore the health implications
of minimum wage policies by both race/ethnicity and
gender.
The findings regarding dietary quality are incon-
sistent with that of Horn et al.(2017) and Andreyeva
et al.(2018) who find reduced dietary quality associ-
ated with minimum wage increases. The results
likely diverge for a number of reasons. We use a dif-
ferent model specification for our count outcomes
(PRM instead of OLS) as well as a different primary
predictor (lagged real minimum wage vs. the ad-
justed wage ratio).
Table 5 The Relationship of Minimum Wage, Access to Care, Health Behaviors and Health (Blacks)
Outcome Total Men Women
Wage Ratio Minimum Wage Wage Ratio Minimum Wage Wage Ratio Minimum Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 .01
(−.01,.03)
N = 95,091
-.00
(−.03,.02)
N = 95,091
.02
(−.01,.05)
N = 34,746
.01
(−.03,.05)
N = 34,746
-.01
(−.03,.02)
N = 60,345
−.02
(−.05,.01)
N = 60,345
Missed care due to cost1 .01
(−.01,.02)
N = 90,096
.00
(−.02,.03)
N = 90,096
.01
(−.02,.04)
N = 32,911
.00
(−.04,.04)
N = 32,911
.00
(−.02,.03)
N = 57,185
.00
(−.03,.04)
N = 57,185
Health Behavior
No exercise1 −.01
(−.03, .02)
N = 85,243
.01
(−.02,.05)
N = 85,243
−.01
(−.05,.03)
N = 31,022
.01
(−.04,.05)
N = 31,022
−.00
(−.03,.03)
N = 54,221
.02
(−.02,.07)
N = 54,221
Fruit Consumption2 1.00
(.92,1.09)
N = 48,174
.98
(.88,1.09)
N = 48,174
.92
(.81,1.05)
N = 17,522
.88
(.75,1.03)
N = 17,522
1.08
(.97,1.20)
N = 30,652
1.08
(.93,1.24)
N = 30,652
Vegetable Consumption2 1.01
(.95,1.08)
N = 48,022
.95
(.88,1.03)
N = 48,022
1.01
(.90,1.12)
N = 17,459
.92
(.81,1.06)
N = 17,459
1.02
(.94,1.11)
N = 30,563
.98
(.88,1.08)
N = 30,563
Alcohol Consumption2 .98
(.89,1.07)
N = 55,024
.99
(.88,1.12)
N = 55,024
.94
(.83,1.06)
N = 22,138
.98
(.84,1.15)
N = 22,138
1.06
(.93,1.20)
N = 32,886
.99
(.84,1.17)
N = 32,886
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 .02
(−.00, .03)
N = 94,980
.01
(−.01,.04)
N = 94,980
.02
(−.01,.05)
N = 34,735
.02
(−.02,.06)
N = 34,735
.01
(−.02,.03)
N = 60,245
.01
(−.02, .04)
N = 60,245
Self-reported HTN1 −.00
(−.03,.03)
N = 52,093
−.00
(−.04,.04)
N = 52,093
.03
(−.02,.08)
N = 19,074
.03
(−.03,.09)
N = 19,074
−.03
(−.07,.00)
N = 33,019
−.03
(−.07,.02)
N = 33,019
Unhealthy Days2 1.01
(.93,1.10)
N = 93,097
1.01
(.90,1.12)
N = 93,097
1.02
(.88,1.18)
N = 34,046
1.01
(.84,1.22)
N = 34,046
1.00
(.91,1.10)
N = 59,051
1.00
(.88,1.13)
N = 59,051
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.04
(.93,1.16)
N = 92,108
1.02
(.89,1.18)
N = 92,108
1.11
(.91,1.35)
N = 33,667
1.11
(.86,1.44)
N = 33,667
.99
(.88,1.11)
N = 58,441
.96
(.82,1.12)
N = 58,441
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.01
(.89,1.14)
N = 91,682
1.04
(.89,1.22)
N = 91,682
.97
(.80,1.18)
N = 33,570
.99
(.76,1.29)
N = 33,570
1.03
(.89,1.19)
N = 58,112
1.08
(.89,1.30)
N = 58,112
The data source is BRFSS (1993–2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count
outcomes, respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food
stamp allotment for a family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, marital
status, education and having minor children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-
response. Total population models also control for gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs
are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-
adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care: p-value−.025, health behaviors: p-value−.0125, and health
outcomes: p-value .010) (Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence Intervals in parenthesis). Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio; Bold indicates
statistical significance
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The findings of increased access to care among the
total population are consistent with the findings of both
McCarrier et al.(2011) and Andreyeva et al.(2018) who
find reductions in the reporting of missed care due to
cost among the total population and increases in well
patient doctor visits among whites associated with mini-
mum wage increases, respectively [12, 13]. These find-
ings suggest that any associated drops in health benefits
by employers to reduce labor cost, on average, were
offset by either the purchase of health insurance in the
individual market, expansions in access to public insur-
ance, or both [30]. However, our analyses show that the
access to care implications of minimum wage increases
vary across race/ethnicity/gender subgroups.
This study finds reported health improvements associ-
ated with minimum wage increases among white
women. Women constitute a larger proportion than
men of workers either at or below minimum wage so
Table 6 The relationship of minimum wage, access to care, health behaviors and health (Latinos)
Outcome Total Men Women
Wage Ratio Minimum
Wage
Wage Ratio Minimum
Wage
Wage Ratio Minimum
Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.02
(−.04, .00)
N = 81,286
-.01
(−.04, .01)
N = 81,286
−.03
(−.06,-.00)
N = 40,809
−.03
(−.06,.01)
N = 40,809
−.00
(−.04, .03)
N = 40,477
.01
(−.02,.05)
N = 40,477
Missed care due to cost1 −.00
(−.02,.02)
N = 76,729
−.01
(−.03,.02)
N = 76,729
−.01
(−.04,.02)
N = 38,546
−.02
(−.05,.01)
N = 38,546
.02
(−.01,.05)
N = 38,183
.02
(−.01,.06)
N = 38,183
Health Behavior
No exercise1 .00
(−.02,.03)
N = 79,855
−.01
(−.04,.02)
N = 79,855
.00
(−.03,.04)
N = 40,049
−.01
(−.05,.03)
N = 40,049
−.00
(−.04,.03)
N = 39,806
−.01
(−.05,.03)
N = 39,806
Fruit Consumption2 1.10
(1.01,1.21)
N = 38,035
1.10
(.99,1.23)
N = 38,035
1.16
(1.03,1.31)
N = 18,888
1.17
(1.01,1.36)
N = 18,888
1.03
(.90,1.17)
N = 19,147
1.00
(.86,1.16)
N = 19,147
Vegetable Consumption2 1.04
(.96,1.13)
N = 37,186
.98
(.89,1.07)
N = 37,186
1.04
(.93,1.16)
N = 18,387
1.00
(.88,1.14)
N = 18,387
1.03
(.93,1.15)
N = 18,799
.94
(.83,1.06)
N = 18,799
Alcohol Consumption2 .98
(.88,1.09)
N = 56,398
.92
(.81,1.04)
N = 56,398
.99
(.87,1.11)
N = 30,959
.91
(.79,1.05)
N = 30,959
.92
(.77,1.08)
N = 25,439
.94
(.75,1.18)
N = 25,439
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 −.00
(−.02,.02)
N = 81,113
−.01
(−.03,.02)
N = 81,113
−.00
(−.03,.03)
N = 40,734
−.01
(−.05,.03)
N = 40,734
.01
(−.03,.04)
N = 40,379
.00
(−.03,.04)
N = 40,379
Self-reported HTN1 .00
(−.03,.03)
N = 42,576
.00
(−.03,.04)
N = 42,576
−.01
(−.05,.02)
N = 21,225
.00
(−.04,.04)
N = 21,225
.03
(−.01,.07)
N = 21,351
.01
(−.04,.05)
N = 21,351
Unhealthy Days2 1.11
(1.02,1.21)
N = 80,129
1.03
(.92,1.14)
N = 80,129
1.14
(.99,1.30)
N = 40,212
1.06
(.90,1.24)
N = 40,212
1.08
(.96,1.21)
N = 39,917
1.00
(.87,1.14)
N = 39,917
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.10
(.97,1.24)
N = 79,127
.99
(.85,1.15)
N = 79,127
1.14
(.94,1.37)
N = 39,742
1.01
(.80,1.27)
N = 39,742
1.06
(.90,1.23)
N = 39,385
.97
(.81,1.16)
N = 39,385
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.15
(1.03,1.30)
N = 78,963
1.10
(.96,1.27)
N = 78,963
1.19
(1.00,1.41)
N = 39,659
1.15
(.94,1.41)
N = 39,659
1.11
(.96,1.29)
N = 39,304
1.05
(.88,1.25)
N = 39,304
The data source is BRFSS (1993–2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count
outcomes, respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food
stamp allotment for a family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, marital
status, education and having minor children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-
response. Total population models also control for gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs
are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-
adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care: p-value−.025, health behaviors: p-value−.0125, and health
outcomes: p-value .010) (Bonferroni-corrected 95% confidence intervals in parenthesis). Notes: 1. Marginal Effect 2. Rate Ratio; Bold indicates
statistical significance
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women generally and white women particularly, have
the potential for substantial financial benefit from mini-
mum wage increases which may manifest in improved
health outcomes [7].
Conversely, this study finds negative and mixed health
outcomes reported among white and Latino men, respect-
ively associated with minimum wage increases and a nega-
tive trend in health outcomes for black men. These findings
are somewhat consistent with the work of Horn et al.
(2017) that finds increases in self-reported fair/poor health
among men associated with minimum wage increases.
However, these findings are inconsistent with the work of
Andreyeva et al.(2018) who do not find adverse health ef-
fects associated with minimum wage increases among mi-
norities; however, since they combine blacks and Latinos
and do not disaggregate the results by gender it is difficult
to directly compare these results. Averett et al. (2017), the
only study, to our knowledge, to examine the implications
of minimum wage polices across both race/ethnicity (white,
black, Latino) and gender, simultaneously, found that La-
tino male teenagers had increases in self-reported fair/poor
health associated with minimum wage increases [14].
Economic dislocation, as a consequence of reduced
labor demand, is one potential explanation for the
negative association between reported health outcomes
and minimum wage increases among men. Economic
dislocation in the context of minimum wage increases
may be particularly salient for individuals with the low-
est levels of human capital [2]. Specifically, the most
vulnerable workers with very low education levels, or
limited English proficiency may be the first to lose em-
ployment if an increase in the minimum wage induces
employers to cut jobs [31]. Additionally, racial/ethnic/
gender subgroups that are the most highly concen-
trated in labor intensive sectors are particularly vulner-
able to labor restructuring and job loss in the setting
of increased labor costs. Relative to all other race/eth-
nicity/gender groups, Latino men are the most occupa-
tionally segregated in labor intensive sectors so they
may face disproportionate negative economic impacts
from minimum wage increases. By contrast, white men
have the lowest level of occupational segregation and
black men have an intermediate level of occupational
segregation [8, 32]. Increases in access to care is an-
other potential explanation for the worsened health
outcomes reported by white and Latino men, as a con-
sequence of increasing awareness of asymptomatic
medical diseases [33].
Limitations
The results of this study must be interpreted in the
context of several limitations. The study is observa-
tional and could be subject to residual confounding.
The shortcomings of the BRFSS with respect to
potential selection bias have been previously docu-
mented; it is worth noting that underrepresentation
of individuals without home telephones and those
working atypical hours necessarily exclude individ-
uals who may be disproportionately affected by the
minimum wage [34]. Minimum wage changes under-
taken by municipalities are not included. An import-
ant measurement limitation is the use of self-
reported health measures, which have been shown to
be a more reliable predictor of health outcomes in
whites than among racial/ethnic minorities [33].
Additionally, due to changes in the way BLS catego-
rized median wage categories after 1999 the primary
predictor slightly changes after 1999. Given that this
change is not correlated with minimum wage
changes, it is unlikely that this change has significant
implications for our results. BRFSS changed its sam-
pling strategy with the 2011 wave, results are not
formally comparable across years. Since the point of
this analysis is not time trends but rather to use
cross-state variation with year controls, this issue
should not pose a problem for this analysis. These
results—as is the case for almost all of the litera-
ture—examine only the short-term effects of mini-
mum-wage increases. Longer term effects could
differ substantially from those estimated here, but
cannot be identified in empirical analyses without
overly strong assumptions about their timing.
These limitations are balanced by some important
contributions. Given that previous work on this topic
has primarily focused on average population effects, it is
useful to provide preliminary evidence that contributes
to a more comprehensive understanding of how these
policies operate among different portions of the low-
wage work force.
Conclusions
While increasing the minimum wage is associated
with some improvement in access to care and dietary
quality in certain subgroups and improved self-re-
ported health outcomes among white women it may
be linked to negative health outcomes among men.
Although there appears to be enthusiasm for mini-
mum-wage increases in the public health community,
such increases may have to be paired with deliberate
strategies to protect the workers that might be vul-
nerable to economic dislocation, for example with ro-
bust unemployment insurance and increased access to
job training for displaced workers [35]. Future studies
should look at the implications of minimum wage in-
creases for health outcomes across racial/ethnic/gen-
der groups using more valid measures of health
status.
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Table 7 Adjusted Wage Ratio by Time & Census Region [with inter-quartile ranges]
1993-1996 1997-2001 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2014
Northeast 4.19
[4.02 – 4.38]
4.90
[4.69 – 5.19]
5.45
[5.01 –6.04]
6.71
[6.30 – 7.24]
6.89
[6.39 – 7.30]
Midwest 4.43
[4.23 – 4.56]
5.29
[5.00 – 5.58]
5.38
[5.18 – 5.55]
6.92
[6.41 – 7.59]
7.72
[7.54 – 7.82]
South 4.54
[4.27 – 4.44]
5.57
[5.25 – 6.04]
5.70
[5.38 – 6.02]
6.85
[6.01 –7.56]
7.64
[7.16 – 7.95]
West 4.25
[3.87 – 4.53]
5.25
[4.92 – 5.69]
5.87
[5.49 – 6.22]
7.12
[6.63 –7.64]
7.81
[7.52 – 8.17]
All Regions, All Years 6.11
[3.18 - 9.37]
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). [Interquartile Range in brackets
Table 8 High vs. Low Wage in Minimum Wage, Access to Care, and Health (All Races)
Outcome Total Men Women
High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.02
N=747 642
-.00
N=121 789
-.03
N=344 633
-.00
N=54 766
-.02
N=403 009
-.00
N=67 023
Missed care due to cost1 -.01
N=711 473
.01
N=110 914
-.01
N=328 148
.01
N=49 719
-.01
N=383 325
.02
N=61 195
Health Behavior
No exercise1 -.00
N=664 499
.00
N=116 952
.00
N=305 791
.01
N=52 499
-.01
N=358 708
-.01
N=64 453
Fruit Consumption2 1.03
N=389 051
1.13
N=56 648
1.04
N=177 883
1.29
N=25 077
1.02
N=211 168
.96
N=31 571
Vegetable Consumption2 1.06
N=386 748
.89
N=56 385
1.06
N=176 504
.89
N=24 959
1.06
N=210 244
.88
N=31 426
Alcohol Consumption2 1.01
N=476 376
1.03
N=78 405
1.01
N=235 502
1.04
N=38 315
1.02
N=240 874
.99
N=40 090
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 .00
N=747 245
.01
N=121 735
.01
N=344 651
.01
N=54 747
-.00
N=402 594
.01
N=66 988
Self-reported HTN1 .00
N=410 673
.02
N=63 735
.01
N=188 893
.02
N=28 356
.00
N=221 780
.02
N=35 379
Unhealthy Days2 1.02
N=736 989
.99
N=120 881
1.04
N=340 186
.95
N=54 389
1.01
N=396 803
1.02
N=66 492
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.03
N=728 880
.96
N=119 555
1.06
N=336 682
.93
N=53 821
1.01
N=392 198
.98
N=65 734
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.02
N=729 333
1.05
N=119 552
1.03
N=336 990
1.00
N=53 839
1.01
N=392 343
1.11
N=65 713
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count
outcomes, respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp
allotment for a family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, race/ethnicity,
marital status, education and having minor children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-
response. Total population models also control for gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are
presented as percentage point differences in the probability of an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted.
Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care: p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value
.010). Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio
Appendix
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Table 9 High vs. Low Wage in Minimum Wage, Access to Care, and Health (Whites)
Outcome Total Men Women
High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.00
N=532 351
.00
N=91 312
-.00
N=247 036
-.00
N=42 089
-.01
N=285 315
.00
N=49 223
Missed care due to cost1 -.01
N=507 490
.02
N=82 224
-.01
N=235 621
.01
N=37 785
-.01
N=271 869
.03
N=44 439
Health Behavior
No exercise1 .00
N=469 800
.01
N=87 238
.01
N=217 393
.01
N=40 147
-.01
N=252 407
.01
N=47 091
Fruit Consumption2 1.02
N=279 360
1.23
N=42 729
1.03
N=128 598
1.48
N=19 366
1.01
N=150 762
1.00
N=23 363
Vegetable Consumption2 1.04
N=278 403
.87
N=42 620
1.04
N=128 004
.87
N=19 321
1.04
N=150 399
.86
N=23 299
Alcohol Consumption2 1.01
N=344 710
1.06
N=59 306
1.01
N=169 790
1.10
N=29 417
1.02
N=174 920
.95
N=29 889
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 .00
N=532 128
.01
N=91 285
.01
N=247 043
.00
N=42 071
-.01
N=285 085
.01
N=49 214
Self-reported HTN1 -.00
N=296 142
.02
N=47 407
-.00
N=137 269
.03
N=21 677
-.00
N=158 873
.00
N=25 730
Unhealthy Days2 1.00
N=525 105
.99
N=90 634
1.02
N=243 959
.95
N=41 816
.99
N=281 146
1.05
N=48 818
Poor Mental Health Days2 .99
N=519 615
.98
N=89 654
1.01
N=241 610
.96
N=41 386
.98
N=278 005
1.00
N=48 268
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.02
N=520 554
1.07
N=89 774
1.05
N=242 059
.98
N=41 442
1.00
N=278 495
1.18
N=48 332
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count outcomes,
respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp allotment for a
family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, marital status, education and having minor
children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also control for
gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of
an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care:
p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010). Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio
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Table 10 High vs. Low Wage in Minimum Wage, Access to Care, and Health (Blacks)
Outcome Total Men Women
High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 .00
N=80 063
.07
N=14 841
.02
N=29 619
.09
N=5 059
-.01
N=50 444
.03
N=9 782
Missed care due to cost1 .01
N=75 887
.02
N=14 021
.01
N=28 083
.05
N=4 760
.00
N=47 804
-.01
N=9 261
Health Behavior
No exercise1 -.01
N=70 615
-.05
N=14 440
-.01
N=26 053
-.03
N=4 901
-.00
N=44 562
-.06
N=9 539
Fruit Consumption2 1.01
N=41 414
.97
N=6 580
.92
N=15 280
.86
N=2 177
1.08
N=26 134
.99
N=4 403
Vegetable Consumption2 1.01
N=41 315
1.28
N=6 523
1.00
N=15 242
1.49
N=2 151
1.03
N=26 073
1.12
N=4 372
Alcohol Consumption2 .97
N=46 273
1.26
N=8 751
.94
N=18 750
1.17
N=3 388
1.05
N=27 523
1.29
N=5 363
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 .02
N=79 965
.02
N=14 828
.02
N=29 606
.05
N=5 061
.01
N=50 359
-.02
N=9 767
Self-reported HTN1 -.00
N=44 111
.01
N=7 982
.03
N=16 397
-.05
N=2 677
-.03
N=27 714
.07
N=5 305
Unhealthy Days2 1.00
N=78 195
1.16
N=14 716
1.02
N=28 964
1.33
N=5 014
.98
N=49 231
1.03
N=9 702
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.03
N=77 364
1.17
N=14 563
1.11
N=28 639
1.38
N=4 962
.97
N=48 725
1.06
N=9 601
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.00
N=77 026
1.11
N=14 474
.99
N=28 568
1.14
N=4 935
1.01
N=48 458
1.04
N=9 539
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count outcomes,
respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp allotment for a
family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, marital status, education and having minor
children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also control for
gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of
an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care:
p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010). Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio
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Table 11 High vs. Low Wage in Minimum Wage, Access to Care, and Health (Latinos)
Outcome Total Men Women
High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage High Wage Low Wage
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.02
N=72 897
-.07
N=8 389
-.03
N=36 663
-.12
N=4 146
-.00
N=36 234
-.01
N=4 243
Missed care due to cost1 -.00
N=68 767
.02
N=7 962
-.01
N=34 588
.08
N=3 958
.02
N=34 179
-.07
N=4 004
Health Behavior
No exercise1 .00
N=71 610
.03
N=8 245
.00
N=35 970
.13
N=4 079
-.00
N=35 640
-.11
N=4 166
Fruit Consumption2 1.10
N=34 305
.69
N=3 730
1.15
N=17 066
.57
N=1 822
1.03
N=17 239
.96
N=1 908
Vegetable Consumption2 1.05
N=33 519
.61
N=3 667
1.05
N=16 597
.51
N=1 790
1.04
N=16 922
.84
N=1 877
Alcohol Consumption2 .99
N=50 567
.68
N=5 831
.99
N=27 824
.65
N=3 135
.94
N=22 743
1.07
N=2 696
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 -.00
N=72 733
.04
N=8 380
-.01
N=36 596
.06
N=4 138
.01
N=36 137
.01
N=4 242
Self-reported HTN1 .00
N=38 223
-.08
N=4 353
-.01
N=19 112
-.10
N=2 113
.03
N=19 111
-.05
N=2 240
Unhealthy Days2 1.12
N=71 783
.88
N=8 346
1.15
N=36 092
1.03
N=4 120
1.09
N=35 691
.71
N=4 226
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.11
N=70 869
.69
N=8 258
1.14
N=35 666
.80
N=4 076
1.07
N=35 203
.57
N=4 182
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.17
N=70 728
.97
N=8 235
1.20
N=35 586
1.32
N=4 073
1.13
N=35 142
.66
N=4 162
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count outcomes,
respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp allotment for a
family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, marital status, education and having minor
children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also control for
gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of
an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care:
p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010). Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio
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Table 12 Marital Status and Relationship to Minimum Wage, Access to Care, and Health (All Races)
Outcome Total Men Women
Married Single Married Single Married Single
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.02
N=486 874
-.02
N=383 034
-.03
N=235 988
-.03
N=163 616
-.02
N=250 886
-.01
N=219 418
Missed care due to cost1 -.00
N=460 731
-.02
N=362 133
-.00
N=223 198
-.02
N=154 873
-.00
N=237 533
-.01
N=207 260
Health Behavior
No exercise1 -.00
N=436 872
-.00
N=345 057
.01
N=211 280
-.00
N=147 215
-.01
N=225 592
-.00
N=197 842
Fruit Consumption2 1.03
N=251 012
1.03
N=195 150
1.05
N=120 685
1.02
N=82 472
1.01
N=130 327
1.04
N=112 678
Vegetable Consumption2 1.04
N=250 015
1.06
N=193 587
1.05
N=120 005
1.06
N=81 658
1.04
N=130 010
1.07
N=111 929
Alcohol Consumption2 1.02
N=306 208
.99
N=248 573
1.02
N=158 076
.98
N=115 741
1.00
N=148 132
1.03
N=132 832
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 -.00
N=486 541
.01
N=382 916
.00
N=235 872
.01
N=163 731
-.00
N=250 669
-.00
N=219 185
Self-reported HTN1 .00
N=266 322
.01
N=208 086
.00
N=128 816
.01
N=88 433
.00
N=137 506
.00
N=119 653
Unhealthy Days2 1.03
N=480 726
1.01
N=377 619
1.03
N=233 165
1.02
N=161 614
1.02
N=247 561
1.00
N=216 005
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.05
N=476 342
1.01
N=372 555
1.07
N=231 271
1.02
N=159 433
1.02
N=245 071
.99
N=213 122
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.01
N=476 413
1.02
N=372 941
1.01
N=231 279
1.04
N=159 752
1.02
N=245 134
1.01
N=213 189
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count outcomes,
respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp allotment for a
family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, race/ethnicity, education and having minor
children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also control for
gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of
an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care:
p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010) Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio; Bold indicates statistical significance.
Narain and Zimmerman BMC Public Health         (2019) 19:1069 Page 16 of 20
Table 13 Marital Status and Relationship to Minimum Wage, Access to Care, and Health (Whites)
Outcome Total Men Women
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.00
N=376 398
-.00
N=247 534
-.00
N=178 021
-.01
N=11 233
-.01
N=198 377
-.00
N=136 301
Missed care due to cost1 -.01
N=356 354
-.01
N=233 629
-.00
N=168 404
-.01
N=105 131
-.01
N=187 950
-.01
N=128 498
Health Behavior
No exercise1 .01
N=335 959
.00
N=221 348
.02
N=158 379
.01
N=99 290
-.01
N=177 580
-.01
N=122 058
Fruit Consumption2 1.02
N=195 182
1.03
N=127 169
1.03
N=91 720
1.05
N=56 368
1.01
N=103 462
1.01
N=70 801
Vegetable Consumption2 1.02
N=194 897
1.05
N=126 391
1.03
N=91 526
1.05
N=55 926
1.02
N=103 371
1.05
N=70 465
Alcohol Consumption2 1.00
N=239 901
1.01
N=164 115
1.01
N=120 002
1.01
N=79 205
.99
N=119 899
1.04
N=84 910
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 -.00
N=376 165
.00
N=247 517
.01
N=177 921
.01
N=111 322
-.01
N=198 244
-.01
N=136 195
Self-reported HTN1 .00
N=207 719
.00
N=135 830
.00
N=98 205
.00
N=60 741
.00
N=109 514
.00
N=75 089
Unhealthy Days2 1.02
N=371 785
.99
N=244 223
1.03
N=175 962
1.00
N=109 942
1.00
N=195 823
.98
N=134 281
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.01
N=368 657
.98
N=240 874
1.02
N=174 689
.98
N=108 435
1.01
N=193 968
.97
N=132 439
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.02
N=368 973
1.03
N=241 622
1.04
N=174 726
1.04
N=108 833
.99
N=194 177
1.02
N=132 789
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count outcomes,
respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp allotment for a
family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, education and having minor children, year as
well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also control for gender. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of an outcome and Rate
Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care: p-value-.025, health
behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010) Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio
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Table 14 Marital Status and Relationship to Minimum Wage, Access to Care, and Health (Blacks)
Outcome Total Men Women
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 .00
N=31 203
.01
N=63 888
.01
N=14 829
.03
N=19 917
-.01
N=16 374
-.01
N=43 971
Missed care due to cost1 .01
N=29 568
.00
N=60 528
.01
N=14 053
.00
N=18 858
.01
N=15 515
-.00
N=41 670
Health Behavior
No exercise1 .02
N=27 859
-.02
N=57 384
.03
N=13 154
-.03
N=17 868
.00
N=14 705
-.00
N=39 516
Fruit Consumption2 1.02
N=15 928
.99
N=32 246
.98
N=7 529
.86
N=9 993
1.05
N=8 399
1.09
N=22 253
Vegetable Consumption2 1.02
N=15 895
1.01
N=32 127
1.06
N=7 514
.98
N=9 945
.98
N=8 381
1.04
N=22 182
Alcohol Consumption2 .97
N=17 247
.98
N=37 777
.96
N=8 918
.94
N=13 220
1.00
N=8 329
1.07
N=24 557
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 .02
N=31 183
.01
N=63 797
.04
N=14 816
.00
N=19 919
-.00
N=16 367
.02
N=43 878
Self-reported HTN1 .02
N=17 124
-.01
N=34 969
.06
N=8 181
.02
N=10 893
-.03
N=8 943
-.03
N=24 076
Unhealthy Days2 1.03
N=30 549
1.00
N=62 548
1.03
N=14 532
1.01
N=19 514
1.01
N=16 017
1.00
N=43 034
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.11
N=30 238
1.01
N=61 870
1.18
N=14 382
1.07
N=19 285
1.02
N=15 856
.97
N=42 585
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.00
N=30 095
1.01
N=61 587
.95
N=14 324
.99
N=19 246
1.06
N=15 771
1.03
N=42 341
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count
outcomes, respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp
allotment for a family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, education and having
minor children, year as well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also
control for gender. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in
the probability of an outcome and Rate Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance
levels: *(access to care: p-value-.025, health behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010) Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio
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Table 15 Marital status and relationship to minimum wage, access to care, and health (Latinos)
Outcome Total Men Women
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Married
(mr)
Single
(sg)
Access to Care
No Health Insurance1 -.02
N=43 470
-.02
N=37 816
-.01
N=24 170
-.05
N=16 639
-.03
N=19 300
.01
N=21 177
Missed care due to cost1 .03
N=40 941
-.03
N=35 788
.02
N=22 751
-.05
N=15 795
.05
N=18 190
-.00
N=19 993
Health Behavior
No exercise1 -.01
N=42 775
.01
N=37 080
-.00
N=23 772
.01
N=16 277
-.02
N=19 003
.02
N=20 803
Fruit Consumption2 1.09
N=20 366
1.14
N=17 669
1.18
N=11 181
1.15
N=7 707
.94
N=9 185
1.14
N=9 962
Vegetable Consumption2 1.01
N=19 932
1.08
N=17 254
1.01
N=10 880
1.09
N=7 507
1.00
N=9 052
1.07
N=9 747
Alcohol Consumption2 .98
N=29 723
.96
N=26 675
.99
N=17 970
.97
N=12 989
.89
N=11 753
.94
N=13 686
Health Outcomes
Self-reported poor health1 -.01
N=43 371
.01
N=37 742
-.02
N=24 133
.01
N=16 601
.01
N=19 238
.01
N=21 141
Self-reported HTN1 -.02
N=22 818
.02
N=19 758
-.03
N=12 580
.01
N=8 645
.01
N=10 238
.04
N=11 113
Unhealthy Days2 1.15
N=42 866
1.07
N=37 263
1.17
N=23 823
1.09
N=16 389
1.11
N=19 043
1.07
N=20 874
Poor Mental Health Days2 1.15
N=42 371
1.05
N=36 756
1.20
N=23 569
1.05
N=16 173
1.08
N=18 802
1.06
N=20 583
Poor Physical Health Days2 1.19
N=42 277
1.12
N=36 686
1.20
N=23 524
1.18
N=16 135
1.17
N=18 753
1.08
N=20551
The data source is BRFSS (1993-2014 panels). Linear Probability Models and Poisson Regression Models are used to examine dichotomous and count outcomes,
respectively. All models control for state earned income tax credit rate, refundability of state earned income tax credit, Maximum food stamp allotment for a
family of 3 maximum TANF allotment for a family of 3, 1-year lagged GDP, comprehensive Medicaid expansion, age, education and having minor children, year as
well as state fixed-effects. All models are weighted for complex survey design and non-response. Total population models also control for gender. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the state level. Results of LPMs and PRMs are presented as percentage point differences in the probability of an outcome and Rate
Ratios, respectively. All monetary values are inflation-adjusted. Boldface indicates statistical significance. Significance levels: *(access to care: p-value-.025, health
behaviors: p-value-.0125, and health outcomes: p-value .010) Notes: 1. Marginal effect 2. Rate Ratio
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